State of Utah v. John Markham : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1941
State of Utah v. John Markham : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Grover A. Giles; Attorney General of Utah; Zar E. Hayes; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Plaintiff and Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. Markham, No. 6249 (Utah Supreme Court, 1941).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/680
.,.. 
I I. 
No. 6249 
In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHN MARKHAM, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Appeal From the Third District Court of Utah, 
for Salt Lake County 
Hon. Oscar W. McConkie, Judge 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
GROVER A. GILES, 
Attorney General of Utah 
ZAR E. HAYES, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and RespQndent. 
11? I b rl t~J~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 -3t-~ 
Statement of Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... 1-6 
TABLE OF CITATIONS 
89 A. L. R. 299,. . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 20 
Alder v. State (1932, Okla.), 12 Pac. 
( 2d) 545, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 26 
.Anthony v. State, 159 Pac. 934, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10) • • • • • • • • • • • i) 
Barnett v. State (Okla., 1923), 219 P. 726, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ ...... 14-20 
Briola v. People ( Colo. 1 1925), 2.32 Pac. 924. 
2,.., • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I 
Brittain v. Gorman, 42 Utah 586; 113 P. 
370. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... !:} 
Caldwin v. Comm. (Ky., 1933), 57 S. W. 
(2d) 487, and . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 31 
Chambers v. State, 182 Pac. 714, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •· ......... 12 
City of Victor, et al, v. Halstead (1928 
Col.). 271 Pac. 185. . . . . . . . . . .......... 20 
Commonwealth of ~a. v. Garramone, 161 
Atl. 733~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ 16-17 
Commonwealth v. Sterling (Pa., 1934), 170 
A tl. 258, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 16 
Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 5, page 472 
and page 476 ........................ 19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CITATIONS 
(A Continuation) 
Cryderman v. State, 161 N. W. 1045, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... ·. . . . .......... 17 
Daniel v. State, 118 Ga. 16; 43 S. E. 861, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 28 
Flinders v. Hunter, 60 Utah 314; 268 P. 
526. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... · ........ 9 
~,orrest v. State, 81 Tenn. (13 Lea) 103. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 29 
Fritz v. State, 128 P·ae. 170, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . ........... 11 
Georgia Penal Code of 1895, Section 1036 ... ·28 
Gurera v. United States, 40 Federal (2d) 
338,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 32 
In Re Yowell's Estate, 75 Utah 312; 285 
p. 285. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... 9 
Jaggy, et ux. v. Rooney, et ux., 112 P. 
3671.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 10 
Jensen v. D. & R. G. R. R. Co., 44 Utah 100; 
138 p. 1185. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... 9 
Knight v. Wessler, 67 Utah 354; 248 P. 132. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 10 
Konold v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 21 Utah 
379; 60 P. 1021. . . . . . . . . . . ........... 9 
I_Janca.ster v. State, 18 S. W. 777, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 28 
Leach v. State (Tenn., 189'7), 42 S. W. 195, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 29 
Louis v. State, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 127. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 29 
Marshall v. State, 74 Ga. 26,.. . . .......... 27 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CITA'riONS 
(A Continuation) 
~fay v. People (Colo., 192'5), 236 Pac. 1022 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 27 
~fuller v. State (Wis., 1932), 243 N. \~V. 
411, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 3() 
Muzik v. State, 156 N. W._ 1056, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... 17 
N a.isbitt v. Herrick, 76 Utah 575; 290 P. 
950. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... 9 
Oliver v. State (1933), 23 Pac. (2d) 718. 
• • • • • . • . . • . . . • • . • • • . . . . . . •...••.... 2t-i 
Section 103-28-3 Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 36 
Section 103-28-4. Revised Sta,tutes of Utah, 
1933, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 7' 22, 36 
Section 105-43-3, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... s 
Section 557, Olson'$ Oregon Laws, 1920, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ·' ....... 31 
Section 6098, Milliken and Vertrees, Code 
of Tennessee, . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 29 
Section 8805, Revised Codes of Montana. 
1921,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 32 
State v. Allen & Allen, 32 Iowa 248 ........ 35 
State v. Bamsey, 22·3 N. W. 873, ........... 35 
State v. Barth, 176 Atl. 183, ........... 21 
State v. Casey (Ore., 192'3), 217 Pac. 632, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 31 
State v. Olander, (Iowa, 1922), 186 N. W. 53, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 23 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CITATIONS 
(A Continuation) 
State v. Davenport, 149 Iowa 294 .......... 35 
State v. Dooley (Iowa, 1894), 57 N. W. 
414,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 30 
State v. Fowler (Mont., 1921), 196 Pac. 992. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .......... 32 
State v. Freeman, 27 Iowa 333, ........... 3'5 
State v. ·Houston, 50 Iowa 512, 
........... 24 
State v. Johnson, (S. C., 1930), 156 S. E. 
353.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 31 
State v. Junkins (1910, Iowa), 126 N. W. 
689, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 33 
State v. Lee, (Del.), 171 Atl. 195 ........... 21 
State v. Morris, 44 Ut. 31; 122 P. 380, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... 7 
State v. N olta, 218 N. W. 144. . . .......... 35 
State v. Ramirez, 203 Pac. 279, ........... 15 
State v. Smith (Iowa, 1905), 103 N. W. 
769, ................................ 25 
State v. Schaffer (1\tlont., 1921), 197 
Pac. 986, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 3.2 
State v. State ex rel. Shull (1930), 286 
P. 891, . . . . . . . . . . ... ·. . . . . .......... 10 
State v. Van Waters (Wash., 1904), 78 
P ac. 897, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... 26 
State v. Webb, 18 Utah 441; 56 P. 159. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........... 9 
State v. Wilmoth, 63 Iowa 380. . .......... 35 
Warren on Homicide, Page 526, Vol. 4, 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 21 
Wilder v. Wilder, 7 Pac. (2d) 1032 ........ 20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JOHN ~I.L~Rl(HAM, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMEiNT OF FACTS 
The facts of the case are quite fully set forth in 
Appellant's Brief and, with a fe'v exceptions which 
\vill be later set forth, are agreed to by the respond· 
ent. Because, hov1ever7 there are some points of 
fact which are considered important and which are 
not emphasized in Appellant's Brief, and because 
the nature of the question raised on appeal is, such 
that the facts are of paramount importance, and 
further since Appellant's Brief is typewritten, it is 
deemed advisable to, at least briefly, restate the 
facts here in printed form. 
The defendant was. convicted of the crime or 
murder in the first degree, with a jury recommen .. 
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dation of life imprisonment. The court, however, 
in the exercise of its statutory judicial discretion, 
declined to follow the recommendation of the jury 
and rendered judgment sentencing the defendant 
to death. 
'l1he crime \vas committed, and all of the other acts 
n1entioned in this statement o{ fact occurred, in 
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Sta.te of Utah, 
except where otherwise herein specifically in· 
dicated. 
The State obtained . a written ·confession in de-
fendant's own handwriting, (Exhibit 0) and an-
other confession by way of questions propounded 
by Salt Lake County Attorney Harold E. Wallace, 
and answers given by the defendant (Exhibit P). 
There was also testimony given by W. E.· Eggles· 
ton, a ·Salt Lake City police officer, concerning 
several conversations had with the defendant, 
wherein defendant admitted the commission of the 
crime and described how he had accomplished it. 
The State's evidence showed that the defendant, a 
male, 24 years of age, had worked at various times 
during a period of about two years from 1937 as a 
porter and shoe-shiner in the Mcintyre Building 
and in a shoe-shine par ior near that building. Dur· 
ing this period, defendant became acquainted with 
the deceased, J. G. Smith, who, for about five years 
prior to his death, was the o\vner and operator of a. 
candy and cigar counter in the lobby of the Mc-
Intyre Building. On the afternoon of November 
25, 1939, defendant was in the vicinity of the Me· 
Intyre Building, although he was not working there. 
It was during this time that he conceived the idea 
and formulated his plans to rob Mr. Smith. The 
defendant was seen leaving the Mcintyre Building 
at about 6 P. M., on the date mentioned. From hi~ 
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approximately two years' acquaintance with Mr. 
Sn1ith and fron1 his 'vork in the lVlcintyre Building, 
defendant "·as 'Yell acquainted with the habits of 
Mr. Smith. He knew that Srnith would close his 
stand at about 8 P. 11., place the day's receipts in 
a money sack, place this sack in his lunch box and 
walk to his home in a direction easterly o:ri South 
Temple Street to '' J'' Street and then north on '' J'' 
Street. 
The robbery was deliberately and coldly planned 
and having determined to commit that crime, the 
defendant went to his home where he had some· 
thing to eat and then went to the rear of his hon1e 
for the particular and special purpose of searchil}g 
for and obtaining a 'veapon. (Tr. 259). Deliberate 
ly he chose for this purpose an iron pipe, (Exhibit 
G) - a weapon which, if used, might easily be ex-
pected to kill. Having procured this lethal weapon, 
he placed it in his pocket. He then proceeded to 
''J" Street between 1st and 2nd Avenues, where 
he lingered in the darkness until about 9 P. M., 
when he sa\V ~{r. Smith turn off South Temple and 
walk north on '~ J" Street. Defendant then con-
cealed himself behind a tree. \Vhen Mr. Smith hau 
passed slightly beyond this tree, the defendant 
lunged for and seized hold of the lunch box carried 
by ~Jr. Smith. The latter refused to release his 
hold on the lunch box and a struggle ensued, during 
the course of ,vhich the defendant took the iron pipe 
fron1 his pocket and with it struck Mr. Smith over 
the head three or four times. Mr. Smith then fell 
and the defendant seized the lunch box and ran fron1 
the scene of the crime to a vacant lot on Sixth East 
Street between Third and Fourth South Streets, 
where he removed the money, about $20,00, from 
the luncl1 box. Mr. Smith was picked up by two 
persons nnd taken to the Emergenry IIospital, 
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later being removed to the- Holy Cross Hospital, 
wh.ere he died on November 28, 1939. According 
to testimony of Dr. Charles F. Pinkerton, the 
cause of death was cerebral hemorrhage and pres· 
sure ·caused by a skull fracture, resulting from 
blows with a blunt instrument. (Tr. 193). Defend-
ant was apprehended and at first denied commis· 
sion of the offense but later repudiated his deniaJ 
and signed the written confessions (Exhibits 0 and 
P) on December 2, 1939. 
During the course of the trial, defendant did not 
deny responsibility for the homicide, and no evi· 
dence toward such denial '\Vas introduced or prof-
fered in his behalf. In fact, his counsel frankly 
admitted that the homicide was committed by the 
defendant (Tr. 329). The evidence in behalf of the 
defendant related almost entirely to the back~ 
ground, past history and degree of mentality of the 
defendant. It was shown that the defendant was 
one of six children whose father died when the de~ 
fendant '\Vas thirteen years of age. In Appellant's 
.Brief (page 4) it is indicated that from the time thP 
defendant's father died, defendant's n1other was 
.forced to work for the support of herself and her 
children, thus leaving the children, including the 
defendHnt, more or less to shift for themselves and 
to do as they pleased. The evidence, however, 
shows tha.t the defendant continued his schooling 
at the West ,Jordan elementary school for three 
years after his father's death and until he '\Vas. 16 
years of age, and that until that time, his mother 
did not work for wages, except intermittently, ~nd 
hence was not forced to neglect her children during 
that period. (Tr. 301). The defendant was taken 
from either the 7th or 8th grade at the West Jordan 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
School add placed in the State Industrial School at 
Ogden, Utah. (Tr. 309). 
While it appears to be true that the defendant was 
deprived of many of the good things of life, we can 
find nothing in the record to show that the defend-
ant had at any time lacked or wanted for the neces-
sities of life, and the assertion that the defendant's 
life was one of want and deprivation is not war-
ranted by the record. It is true the testin1ony in-
dicated that, after his marriag-e, defendant's prin .. 
cipal snurce of income was from shining shoes and 
work on W. P. A., but the amount of ~oney re-
ceived from those sources is not shown. Certainly 
there is nothing in the record to indicate that the 
defendant's family life, either before or after his 
marriage, was such as to cause him to consider 
lightly and underestimate the duties of citizenship 
and the responsibility and consequences incident to 
breaking the la-\vs of the society in which he lived. 
The defendant, himself, did. not contend that the 
robbery was planned or committed because his fam-
ily was in want. He stated he did it to obtain money 
with which to pay for a washing machine, which he 
had previously purchased. The defendant re-
mained in the Industrial School for a period of 
about 18 1nonths. Shortly after his. release from 
that institution, he got into trouble and was charged 
with burglary, to V{hich charge he pleaded guilty, 
and was confined at the Utah State Penitentiary 
for six months. When released from the peniten .. 
tiary he was 21 years of age. He then married and 
was living with his wife and two children at the 
time this offense was -committed. 
The question of insanity was not an issue in the 
case, and it was not contended that the defendant 
was incapable of having the necessary cri1nina1 in-
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tent; or that he did not know right from wrong; or 
that he was motivated by some cause that he could 
not resist. (Tr. 323). 
Mr. Mark K. Allen, Psychologist of the -utah State 
Training School and Dr. H. H. Ramsey, S_up-er-
intendent of tha.t institution, testified concerning 
defendant's degree of mentality. The qualifications 
of both of thes.e men to testify concerning that sub-
ject is admitted. Mr. Allen uses the New Stanford 
Revision of the Binet Analysis Test, and previously 
had given this test to over 1,000 persons. Accord-
ing to 1\fr. Allen, the normal mental age of an in-
dividual twenty-four years of age, chronologically, 
is fifteen, and an individual, in taking this intelli-
gence test, vvould have to achieve an intelligence 
quotient (i. q.) of 100 in order to be classed as nor-
mal. Dr. Ramsey testified that an intelligence 
quotient of 90 to 110 is normal. Mr. Allen gave the 
defendant one test and concluded that he has an in-
telligence quotient of 67, indicating that his mental 
ability, as compared with that of a normal indi-
vidual was 67 p-ercent of what it should be; that 
his mental age was ten; and that he would be class-
ified as a moron. In other words, that his mental 
development was retarded about one-third. 
In making these tests no symptoms of insanity 
were found. (Tr. 351). Dr. Ramsey gave the de-
fendant no test but did spend some time with de-
fendant in observing him, and from such observa-
tion, coupled \vith his knowledge of the results of 
the test given by l\fr. Allen, reached substantially 
the same ·conclusions as. did Mr. Allen. These wit-
nesses expressed the opinion that the defendant's 
degree of m~ntality was the same on the day of the 
o~ime as it was on the day the 'intelligence test was 
given. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
ARGUMENT 
.A.s a basis for appeal the defendant assigned two 
errors, one of which, ho,vever, 'vas abandoned, the 
only assignment of error argued in .l\ppellant ''s 
Brief being as follows: 
''The trial court abused its discretion and 
erred in refusing and failing to follov{ 
the recommendation of the jury contained 
in their verdict that the defendant be im~ 
prisoned in the State Prison at hard labor 
for life.'' 
It may be here stated that the case is one of first 
ins.tanc.e in this Court bearing upon the question 
here presented. 
Section 103-28-4, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, provides : 
''Every person guilty of murder in the 
first degree sha.ll suffer death, or upon the 
recommendation of the jury, may be im-
prisoned at hard labor in the State Prison 
for life, in the discretion of the ·conrt ... " 
Counsel for appellant concede that where a defend .. 
ant is convicted of murder in the first degree with 
recommendation of life imprisonment, it is not man-
datory upon the trial court to follow such a recom~ 
mendation. The language of the statute a.bove 
quoted is so clear that it admits of no doubt in this 
res.pect. Furthermore, this Court in 
State v. Morris, 44 Ut. 31; 122 P. 380, 
in commenting upon the right of the jury to make 
a recommendation of life imprisonment, states: 
''If such a recommendation is made, the 
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court has the discretion to impose the death 
penalty or such an imprisonment.'' 
In the face of the clear right of the trial court in its 
discretion to disregard the jury's recommendation, 
appellant urges that the trial court in this case 
abused its discretion in so doing to such an extent 
that this Court has the po,ver to, and should, inter· 
fere by reversing and reducing the sentence im· 
posed from death to life imprisonment. With re· 
gard to the power of this Court to so modify the 
sentence, app·ellant refers to 
Seetion 105-43-3, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, which reads as follows: 
''The Court may reverse, affirm or modify 
the judgment or order appealed fro1n, and 
may set aside, affirm or modify any or all 
the proceedings subsequent to or dependent 
upon such judgment or order, and may, if 
proper, order a new trial.'' 
Tha.t statute, too, is clear,· and the State ·concedes 
that this Court has the power to reverse or modify 
a judgment of a lower court, where proper legal 
cause exists for such reversal or modification; but 
it is our contention, and we sincerely and firmly 
urge that the power to so reverse or modify a judg· 
ment is limited to cages wherein it clearly appears 
from the record on appeal that prejudicial error 
was committed by the court below. It is the State'" 
further belief and contention that the exercise of 
a discretion specifically and clearly vested by 
statute in. a lower court, in the manner exercised 
·by the court in this case, is not and cannot be such 
an error as would warrant an interference by this 
Court, even though this Court might be inclined to 
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disagree in principle with the action of the court 
below. 
In considering~ the general question of appellate re· 
view of judicial discretion exercised by lower courts, 
the rule is well established that an Appellate Court 
cannot interfere with discretionary powers of a 
court below and decisions made pursuant to the ex· 
ercise of such powers, unless it clearly appears from 
the record that th-e trial court abused the discretion 
vested in it. 
Brittain v. Gorman, 42 Utah 586; 113 P. 
370. 
As stated in 
Konold v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 21 Utah 
379 ; 60 p. 1021. 
where this Court was ·considering the refusal of the 
lower court to permit an experiment: 
''The presiding judge exercised a discre-
tionary power, and his decision, except in 
cases of palpable abuse of discretion will 
not be reviewed by an A p~pella te Court.'' 
See also 
Jensen v. D. & R. G. R. R. Co., 44 Utah 100: 
138 P. 1185. 
State v. Webb, 18 Utah 441; 56 P. 159. 
Flinders v. Hunter, 60 Utah 314; 268 P. 
526. 
In Re Yo,vell 's Estate, 75 Utah 312; 285 
P. 285. 
N a.isbitt v. Herrick, 76 Utah 575; 290 P. 
950. 
And where, in connection with a question involving 
an exercise of discretion, reasonable minds might 
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draw different conclusions, then the finding of the 
District Court is binding. 
Knight v. Wessler, 67 Utah 354; 248 P. 132. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in 
State v. State ex rel. Shull (1930), 286 
P. 891, 
defined ''abuse of judicia] discretion,'' as follows: 
''Abuse of judicial discretion is a discretion 
exercised to an end or purpose not justi-
fied by, and clearly against, reason and 
evidence. ' ' 
In Jaggy, et ux. v. Rooney, et ux., 112 P. 
367, 
the SupTeme Court of Washington stated: 
''The Court's action upon discretionary 
and advisory matters is not subject to re-
view is this Court, since we .have no way of 
determining the ·effect of such matters 
upon the mind of the Court, or to \vhat ex-
tent, if any, his judgment has be·en influ-
enced or based upon such matters.'' 
;Conceding the power of 3n Appellate Court to re-
view and modify de-cisions made by a lower court 
in the exercise of a discretionary power, where it 
can be clearly established from the record that the 
court's decision is arbitrary and clearly against 
reason and the evidence, in order to determine 
whether or not there has been such an abuse of dis .. 
cretion as to \Varra.nt interference by an Appellate 
Court, the facts developed and adduced at the trial 
must be carefully and thoroughly examined. It is 
upon the facts that such a question must be de· 
termined. With this in mind, let us consider the 
cases cited and discussed in appellant's brief in the 
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order in 'Yllich they there appear. It is believed 
that an examination of the ·cases so cited will dis~ 
close that the facts in those cases are such as to 
make them clearly distinguishable from the case 
here before this Court and to make the decisions in 
such cited cases inap·plicable in the instant ·case. 
Appellant's brief (p~a.ge 8). refers to the case of 
Fritz v. State, 12'8 Pac. 170, 
wherein the Oklahoma Court set forth the 
propositi2n that the power of the Appellate 
Court to modify a sentence from death to 
life imprisonment is in no sense a power of com-
mutation, and hencP does not conflict "\\rith the ex-
ecutive prerogatiYc of granting of clemency. There 
is no doubt that these two powers are, in their 
nature, entirely different and separate, and it is 
1he State's belief that they should be kept separate 
in fact. When, upon the record, it appears that 
error has been committed by the court below pre-
judicial to the defendant's rights, it may be proper 
for the- Appellate Court to modify a judgment. 
However, it seems too obvious to admit of argu-
ment that, in the absence of error of record on the 
part of the court below, any reduction by an Appel-
late Court of a sentence imposed below is, in fact, 
an exercise of thp nower of commutation, call it 
what you may. It is the facts in the case which 
must determine 'vhrther a modifieation of a judg~­
ment helow is a proper exercise of Appellate Court 
power or whether such modification is, in fact, an 
improper exercise of the po"Ter of commutation. 
With respect to the action of the Oklahoma Court in 
reducing the sentence in the cas,e of 
Fritz v. State; supra, 
it is pertinent to note that the facts in that case 
were very different from those in t.lie case now 
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before this Court. The words of the Court therein 
1ndicate that after. considering all the evidence, the 
Court had s.ome small doubt as to whether or not 
the defendant was actually guilty of the murder, 
and hence the possibility existed that an innocent 
man had been condemned to die. The Court said : 
''We think that under all the circumstances, 
as shown by all the evidence, Thelma and 
Jeff Morgan were accomplices of the de-
fendant and when \ve consider the fact that 
the murder of Watson occurred on Septem-
ber 14, and in 14 days from that tin1e the 
defendant was put upon trial, and that the 
o-rder appointing counsel to defend him 
was made only two days before the trial, 
and the fact that the deceased was a white 
man and the defendant a negro, and the 
further fact that although Watson, the de-
ceased} lived until the following day,· he 
failed to make any _statement or declara-
tion as to how his injuries were received, 
it is our opinion, takfng all these circum-
stances of the case into consideration, that 
it would be an injustice, the Nlorgans hav-
ing been allowed to go free, to affirm the 
judgment and sentence.'' 
In the case of Owen v. State, 163 Pac. 548, referred 
to on page 9 of appellant's brief, the Oklahoma 
court modified the sentence to avoid reversing or 
remanding the case for a new trial because of error 
committed in the lo\ver court, which error was pre-
judicial to defendant's rights. The cas.e, therefore~ 
is clearly distinguishable from the instant case and 
.js jnapplicable here. 
In Chambers v. State] 182 Pac. 714, 
the Oklahoma case mentioned on page 10 of appel-
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lant 's brief, the Court, in reducing the penalty fron1 
death to life imprisonment1 stated: 
'' . . . 'j_,he undisputed facts are that the 
defendant and the deceased· 'vere at all 
times intimate and familiar 'vith each 
other; there 'vas no evidence of any an-
imosity bet,veen them. While the defend-
ant's intoxication is no excuse for the 
crime committed, it is a fact tending to 
throw light on other facts and circum-
stances in the case, and at most the evi-
dence tending to show premeditated design 
to take life is very weak and unsatis-
factory.'' 
There, again, we have a case where the Court after 
considering all the evidence expressed some doubt 
as to whether or not all the elements of the crime 
charged had been completely established. No su(l.h 
circumstance~ prevail in the ca8e now before this 
Court. 
In Anthony v. State, 159 Pa.c. 934, 
cited on page 10 of appellant's brief, the Oklahoma 
Court, in n1odifying the sentence, stated: 
"It is fair inference from the facts and 
eircumstanccs in evidence in this case that 
the defendant 1.vas provoked by the con-
duct of his ·w·ifes the probable effect of 
w·hich conduct 'vould be to cause their 
daughter to lead an immoral life, as the 
defendant believed. While the })rovoca-
tion wa.s not sufficient to reduce the hom-
icide from murder to manslaughter in the 
first degree, yet, considering the state of 
thP defendant's mind at the time the hom-
iride "·as . committed, and . it appearing 
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that the testilnonv of the two eye-,vitnesses 
involved inconsistencies and contradictions 
which it is needless to point out, we are of 
the opinion that the jury abused its dis-
cretion in assessing the death penalty, and 
that for this reason the judgment and sen-
tence should be modified to imprisonment 
in the penitentiary for life, at hard labor." 
Again we have a case where the Appellate Court, 
after considering the evidence, indicated a doubt as 
to the credibility of important testimony, plus the 
additional element of great provocation, and hence 
the possibility existed that an innocent man had 
been condemned to die. In the case here before 
the Court neither -of these elements are present. 
In Peters v. State, 211 Pac. 427, 
cited on page 10 of ap'Pellant 's brief, the fact~ 
showed that defendant had previously been con· 
victed of manslaughter in the first degree and sen· 
tenced to ten years in the penitentiary. He was 
dissatisfied with that sentence and sought and ob· 
tained a new trial, the result of which was the ver· 
diet of murder and the sentence of death. In his 
brief, the Attorney General of the State of Okla: 
homa referred to these facts and recommended 1·e~ 
duction of the pena.lty. Renee, here again we find 
extenuating circumstances and reasons for reduc, 
tion of the sentence 'vhich are not present in the 
instant case. 
It will he observed that all of the cases cited by 
appellant and thus far herein co1nmented upon can1e 
from the Oklahoma .A.ppella.te Courts. It is there· 
fore pertinent to call attention to the languaP-"e of 
the Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma i~ 
Barnett v. State (Okla., 1923), 219 P. 726, 
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"Thich is a later case than any Oklahoma case cited 
by appellant, to~t: 
"Before this Court would be authorized to 
modify the judgrnent, some substantial 
error of law should be shown.'' 
Ray v. State, 67 S. W. 553,· 
which is relied upon strongly by the appellant, is a 
Tennessee case wherein the defendant was con· 
victed of murder in the first degree, the jury, how-
ever.) finding mitigating circumstances. The -court 
disregarded the recommendation of the jury and 
sentenced the defendant to death. The Appellate 
f;ourt modified the judgment and reduced the 
sentence to life imprisonment. It is pertinent to 
point out, ho\vever, t~at in tha.t case, the evidence 
:::.howed a possibility of provocation and also the 
possibility that the deceased had threatened the life 
of the defendant. 
In State v. Ramirez, 203 Pac. 279, 
(cited on page 12 of appellant's brief as State v 
R,amuez), the Idaho Court stated: 
"The verdict V\ras based to a great extent 
upon the testi1nony of one Garcia, "\Vh(nn 
the appellant charged with murder. The 
testimony, actionB, and Btatements of the 
\Yi tness, as sho"rn in the record, are of 
such character that we have grave rcis-
givings about the infliction of the death 
penalty. ' ' 
Here again is an instance 'vhere .. because of doubt 
as to the credibility of a witness at the trial, the 
possibility existed that an innocent 1nan had been 
sent0:~red to death. 
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In the case of 
_Commonwealth of Pa. v. Garramone, 161 
Atl. 733J 
referred to in appellant's brief on page 13, the 
Court said: 
"It is clear that this -vvas not an atrocious 
murder, planned and committed in cold 
blood, or one ·committed in the p~e~petra­
tion of robbery or other grave criine, 
though, by saying so, we do not intend to 
enumerate all possible examples of the 
class that should receive sentence of death, 
or otherwi8e attempt to distinguish one 
class from another; definition may come, 
as ·cases present themselves. This is the 
case of an· industrious man without crim .. 
inal record, whose character as a peace· 
ful, law-abiding citizen was testified to by 
a number of persons. After he return~d 
from his day's work and found his wife 
and s.on in the condition described, he com-
mitted the crin1e under the resulting pro-
vocation, and in circumstance which, 've 
think, place him within the· legislative 
classification, requiring the milder of the 
tvvo possible sentences.'' 
This, then, is another cas.e where the defendant 
acted under the stress of great passion and pro .. 
vocation. Also the Court indicates that had tho 
murder been committed while attem:pting a. rnb-
bery, leniency would have been denied. Clearly the 
case differs from the one now under consideration 
in this Court. 'rhis same Pennsylvania Court In 
the later case of 
Commonwealth v. Sterling (Pa., 1934), 170 
Atl. 258, 
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where defendant comn1itted murder 'vhile atte1npt· 
ing a robbery, distinguished that case on the facts 
from 
Commonwealth v. Garramone, supra, 
·and refused to reduce the penalty from death to 
life imprisonment. 
In the case of 
Muzik v. State, 156 N. W. 1056, 
the evidence upon which the Court commented 
showed that the defendant had, for about a. year 
prior to the commission of the crime, been acting 
queerly, and that he behaved in a most unusual 
manner after the crime was accomplished. The 
Court in addition to the language quoted in appel-
lant's brief, stated: 
''Owing to the defendant's mental condi-
tion, there may be great doubts as to his 
responsibility for his actions at the timP. of 
the tragedy, and yet he is neither an idiot, 
an imbecile nor a maniac. '' 
There is no evide·nce in the case no\v before this 
Court that the defendant's mental condition was 
such that he \va.s not responsible for his actions at 
the time the murder was. committed, and neither the 
defendant nor his counsel contended at the trial 
that such was the case. 
In the case of 
Cryderman v. State, 161 N. W. 1045, 
referred to on page 15 of appellant's brief, tne 
Nebraska Supreme Court stated, referring to de-
fendant: 
''He testified that he had been in the hos-
pital for s.everal v;reeks and was 'taken in 
charge for being crazy.' . . . The crime 
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was not committed for p:rofit or gain. No 
rational motive appears. . . . If his mind 
was not wholly deranged, it was not nor-
mal, and was not entirely reliable as a 
regulator of his conduct.'' 
In Schwartz v. State, 225 N. W. 766, cited on page 
15 of appellant's brief, the facts show that the de .. 
fendant \Vas a drug addict. l-Ie had been without 
drugs for a considerable time and his need for 
drugs was so intense that he was very ill. He en-
tered a drug store for the purpose of obtaining 
drugs by robberl. Deceased was shot and killed 
during the attempted robbery. The jury imposed 
the death p:enalty. Without endeavoring to con-
done the use of drugs or to excuse the crime com-
mitted by the defendant, the Nebraska Appellate 
Court discussed in detail the great need of defend .. 
ant for some drug to alle-viate his _ suffering and 
the almost irresistible force which u~ged him to 
procure drugs at any cost. The Appellate Court 
accordingly felt the penalty wa.s too s.evere and re-
duced it to life imprisonment. In the instant case, 
no such circumstances existed and no irresistible 
pressure compelled John Markharn to rob and 
murder J. G. Smith. 
It is believed the foregoing discussion will serve 
to show that the cases cited by appellant are in-· 
applicable and not binding upon this Court in de-
termining the question presented in the instant 
case. Let us, therefore, now consider further the 
question of app·ellate review of discretionary find-
ings and acts of lower courts, and examine some 
eases \Vherein Appellate Courts have declined to 
interfere with such findings and acts. 
\Vith respect to the general question as to whether 
nn .. A_ ppella te Court will revie\v or revise the trial 
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court '8 rulings concerning matters \Vi thin the lat-
ter's discretion, it is stated in 
Corpu8 J-uris Secundum, Vol. 5, page 472: 
'~As a general rule, if there ba~ not been 
a clear abuse of dis-cretion resulting to the 
complaining· party's prejudice, the Appel-
late Court will not review or revise the 
t1·ial court's action or rulings with ref· 
erence to matters resting in the latter's 
judicial dis.cretion. Great \veight is a,ccord· 
ingly g'iven to the judgment of the trial , 
court on discretionary matters . '' 
(Citing nu1nerous cases including the Utah 
case) Campbell v. Union Savings & Invest· 
ment Company, 63 Ut. 366; 226 Pac. 190). 
In the sa1ne works and volume at page 476, it IS 
stated: 
''In determining whether the lovver court 
has abused its discretion the question is 
not whether the reyiewing court agrees 
"rith the court below but rather whether 
it believes that a judicial mind, in view of 
the relevant rules of law applicable to the 
particular case and on due consideration of 
all the circumstances, could reasonably 
have reached the conclusion of the court 
belo\v. 'rhe me1·e fact that the Appellate 
Court would haYe decided otherwise does 
not establish that the discretion has been 
abused, nor does a mere mistake or error 
of law.'' 
vVhere there is a question of abuse of judicial dis-
cretion an Appellate Court should resolve the 
doubt in favor of the proper exercise of the trial 
' 
court's discretionary power, and the complaining 
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party has the burden of showing a prejudicial 
abuse of discretion which must plainly appear trom 
the record. See 
Wilder v. Wilder, 7 Pac. (2d) 1032; also 
City of Victor, et al, v. Halstead (1928 
Col.), 271 .Pac. 185. 
In an annotation at 
89 A. L. R. 299, the following language 
appears: 
''Before the Ap·pellate Court is authorized 
to modify a judgment or conviction by a 
reduction of the punishment imposed, it 
must clearly appear that the punishment 
imposed is ex·cessive or probably the re-
sult of passion and prejudice on the part 
of the trial jury, or else that son1e sub-
stantial error of law has occurred at the 
trial prejudicial to the defendant in the 
amount of punishment imposed." 
Citing Barnett v. State) supra. 
The record shows that the trial court was excep-
tionally lenient in admitting evidence in behalf of 
defendant, to assure that nothing would be kept out 
which. might possibly have a. bearing upon the de-
gree. of defendant's guilt. In permitting such tes-
timony a good deal of evidence was given concern-
ing defendant's background, antecedent life and 
degree of mentality. Our law recognizes insanity 
as a defense to criminal acts, but there is nothing 
in our laws which distinguishes, for purposes of 
punishment, between persons of high mentality and 
those of low· mentality, short of insanity. Any 
recommendation of the jury made upon the basis 
of defendant.'s background or degree of mentality 
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tnust have been based upon sympathy for him. A 
jury should not reconunend the defendant to the 
leniency of the court because of Inere sy1npa.thy. 
State v. I.ee, (Del.), 171 Atl. 195. 
At Page 526, Vol. 4, vVarren on Homicide, 
this statement appears: 
"Regarding the matter of recommending 
life imprisonment, the jury should consider 
the evidence bearing upon his guilt and 
innocence. Evidence relating to his past 
life and antecedent background should be 
excluded.'' 
In State v. Barth, 176 Atl. 183, 
the Court stated: 
'' . . rrhe evidence offered necessarily 
\Vas aimed at showing~ that the defendant 
in his family life had been habituated to 
an atmosphere of violence, firearins and 
crime, and being so ha.bi tua ted, should not 
be put to death for corrrrnitting murder in 
the attempted perpetration of a robbery. 
The necess.ary results of such reasoning 
is that the \Vorse the early training, the 
stronger the argument for a recommenda-
tion of mercy; and the professional gang-
ster rearerl and schooled in crime, perhaps 
convicted of eri1ne a dozen times previous-
ly} should be spared because of an un-
fortunate early training, where others, 
more tenderly reared, go to the electric 
] . ' ' c 1a1r. 
Such an argument does not have the quality of 
reasonableness, g·ood judgment or common sense. 
On the contrary it p~laces a premium upon a pre-
viously bad record and strikes a blo'v at a funda-
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mental principle of our form of government, i. e., 
equality of all persons under the law. 
Our statute under which the defendant, Markham, 
was sentenced. 
Section 103.-28-4, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, 
:wa.s no doubt written as it is to guard against just 
Buch a situation as existed at the trial of this case. 
In framing and adopting this statute, it was no 
doubt recognized that cases might arise wherein 
the jury would misinterpret the evidence or its pur· 
pose or permit mere sympathy to sway their judg~ 
ment, thus causing them to recommend leniency 
when the evidence in the case did not warrant such 
a recommendation. For this reason provision was 
made giving to the court the discretion to de4 
termine what the sentence should be, irresp~ective 
of any recommendation which the jury might make. 
It is true that the jury's recommendation places 
a great burden upon the trial judge to give it his 
most careful and thoughtful consideration. But 
having made a thorough study of the facts and evi-
dence of the case, and given due weight to the 
jury's recommendation, it is not merely the right 
but it is the duty of the triat judge, if he is con-
vinced in his own mind that such recommendation 
is improper, to ignore it and impose su·ch sentence 
as, in his best judg'ment, he £feels, p·rop:er. 'Tihe 
statute places upon the tr:ial court the ultimate bur· 
den of determining what the sentence shall be. 
It is true that, in the instant case, the court dis 4 
regarded the ju:ry's recommendation but, there is 
no showing that he acted arbitrarily, cap·riciously, 
or that his decision and judgment was contrary to 
~eason or the evidence. Hence, it is difficult to 
conceive how it can properly be contended that the 
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con rt erred silnply because he fearlessly performed 
a duty placed upon hin1 by the statute, in the man .. 
ner which his judgment and conscience 'dictated. 
Bearing in Inincl that, bec.ause of the nature of the 
question presented by this appeal, the facts are the 
things from which it must be ultin1ately determined 
whether or not a court belo'v ha.s abused a dis .. 
cretionary power, it is believed the Court's atten~ 
tion should be called to a number of cases wherein 
defendants have complained of excessive sentences 
imposed by lower courts and vvherein the Appellate 
·courts have refused to interfere 'vith and reduce 
the sentences of the trial courts; and because of the 
importance of the facts in determining whether 
there ha.s been an abu?.e of discretion, vve have en-
deavored to give a con1prehensive picture o£ the 
facts in the cases cited, in addition to the rulings 
of the courts. For the same reason, it has been 
deemed advisable to cite and set forth a. consider-
able number of cases so as to assist this Court in 
obtaining for purposes of comparison a more broad 
insight into the various circumstances and condi~ 
tions under which Appellate Courts have held tliat 
the facts were not sufficient to warrant tlie- con-
clusion thflt trial courts had been guilty of an 
abuse of judicial discretion. 
In fue case of 
State v. Olander, (Iovva, 1922'), 186 N. W. 53, 
the facts sho""l\'':rl th:1t the deceased. 'vhile engaged 
jn hjs duty as a merchant 'vas killed hv a shot from 
a revolver held in the bands of the defendant while 
he and two ·confederates were ·perpetrating a rob-
bery. Defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of mur-
der and was sentenced to death. His confederates 
had jury trials, were convicted and given sentences 
of life imp·risonment. The back.gTound of the de-
fendant in that case was remarkably similar to that 
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of the defendant, Markham. He was 28 years old. 
When he was quite young his father deserted the 
family. When the defendant was about 15 years of 
age, he stole some property of small value and was 
sent to Industrial School, where he remained for 
two or three years. Wheri paroled from that in-
stitution he worked at various places. He married 
and had three young children. The Appellate Court 
declined to reduce the sentence but concerning itg 
power to do so, said: 
''This power will~ be exercised only when 
the court below ha·s manifestly visited too 
severe a penalty - one disproportionate to 
the degree of guilt as shown by the proof. 
To justify the exercise of such power, it 
must be made to appear that the punish-
ment is excessive. There must be some 
legal duty upon which to base its action in 
reducing the sentence.'' 
In State v. Houston, 50 Iowa 512, 
defendant wa.s convicted of murder in the second 
degree and sentenced to 25 years iimprisolnment. 
The victim was the defendant's father-in-law and 
the relationship~ bet,veen them had been very un-
friendly. Defendant's wife went to the victim's 
house, where she was followed by the defendant, 
who was refused admittance to the house, where-
upon he broke through the door and killed the 
victim. The A.ppellate Court refused to reduce tiie 
penalty imposed. Because it contains what we be-
lieve to be a good statement of the p!roper function 
of a.n Appellate Court in such cases, the following 
is quoted from a concurring opinion in the Houston 
case: 
"In the absence of a jury trial and upon a 
plea of guilty, the duty is cast upon the dis-
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t rict court to fix the penalty. The penalty 
thus fixed in this ·case by the district court 
"\Yas "\Yarranted by the record before it. The 
record presented to us disclosed no mitigat· 
ing facts. . . . Our jurisdiction in this case 
is appellate only. We are not justified in 
modifying the judgment below, unless there 
be some reason for it apparent on the 
record. . . . Our function is judicial; it 
is ours to determine the guilt or innocence 
of the defendant, and, if he is guilty, to 
apply the p~enal statute in such case pro-
vided. We have no function of executive 
clemency. Unless upon the record v;e can 
differentiate the offense therein disclosed 
from one of extreme cruelty, and can find 
in the record mitigating reasons why the 
extreme penalty should not in :this case 
be imposed, then v;re are '\Vithout authority 
to interfere at all with the judgment of the 
trial court. 
In State v. Smith (Iowa, 1905), 103 N. W. 
769 
' defendant was charged with murder, entered a 
plea of guilty and was sentenced to death. He 
appealed, asserting only that the penalty was ex-
cessive. Said the Court: 
''Code 8 ectio!l ,£728 provides, in substance 
that whoever is guilty of murder in the 
first degre·e shall be punished ,vith death 
or imprisonment for life, as determined by 
the court, if the defendant pleads guilty. 
Manifestly, a large discretion is vested in 
the trial court in such cases, and 've should 
not interfere in the absence of a ~howing of 
fl b11~e of that discretion.'' 
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In Alder v. State (1932, Okla..), 12 Pac. 
(2d) 545, 
defendant was tried for murder, interposed the de-
fense of insanity, but was convicted and his punish· 
ment fixed at death. He appealed, urging no error 
at the trial but contending that the punishment 
should be reduced to life imprisonment because 
of his mental condition. The Court declined to 
modify or reduce the penalty, using this language: 
''Under the provisions of Section 2820 -
Comp. St., 1921, there is conferred on this 
Court power to reverse, affirm or modify 
the judgment appealed from. The right of 
modification, however, is not unlimited. It 
must, a.s a matter of law, be \vithin the lim-
its of the punishment fixed by the statute 
for the offense for which the accused was 
convicted. It must further be· the exercise 
of a judicial power, as .distinguished from 
the executive power of commutation, re-
prieve, pardon or parole . . . Upon what 
consi<;leration then shall this Court modify 
the judgment~ Having regard for the law, 
we cannot do so for reasons of sentiment 
or sympathy; we can do so only if we can 
say judicially that under the entire record 
the punishment is too severe and that jus-
tice requires it be modified to life im-
prisonment '· 
See also the later Oklahoma case, 
Oliver v. State (1933), 23 Pac. (2d) 718. 
In State v. Van Waters (Wash., 1904), 78 
Pac. 897, 
defendant was convicted of rape upon a person 
under the age of consent and sentenced to imprison-
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ment for a term of 25 years in the State peniten .. 
tiary. In refusing to reduce the sentence, the Court 
stated: 
''The sentence imposed by the court, \Vhile 
within the limitations of the statute, seems 
to us unnecessarily severe in the light of 
the evidence. If 've felt that it was within 
our recognized powers, we would direct a 
modification of it, reducing the period to 
five years. But our investigation led us 
to doubt the authority of an Appellate 
Court to reduce or rnodify a sentence which 
is "-rithin the discretion of the trial court 
to impose, and we n1ention the matter here 
in the hop·e it may aid the app,ellant in in-
ducing the pardoning power to exercise its 
clemency in his behalf after he has served 
a reasonable time." 
See also, to the same effect, 
~fay v. People (Colo., 192'5), 236 Pac. 1022 
and 
Briola v. People (Colo., 1925) 1 232 Pac. 924. 
In the case of 
M::n·qhall v. State, 74 Ga. 26, 
defendant 'vas convicted of murder and sentenced 
to death. On appeal it was urged that the sentence 
was excessive and should be reduced. ·Said the 
Appellate Court : 
"It is discretionary vvith the judge, where 
the jury fail to recommend otherwise, and 
where the convictio~ is had solely upon 
circumstantial evidence, to sentence to 
death or to imprisonment in the peniten-
tiary for life, (Code Sec. 4323) and this 
Court will rarely, if everr j11t.erfere with 
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the exercise of this discretion. The case 
must be an extreme one to induce or even 
warrant the interference of thfs Court.'' 
See also 
Daniel v. State, 118 Ga. 16; 43 S. E. 861, 
holding that the refusal of the trial judge to follow 
the recommendation of the jury, that one found 
guilty of assault and battery with infent to murder 
be punished as for a misdemeanor~ is not causo 
for a new trial, such recommendation being entire· 
ly subject to the approval of the Court under the 
Georgia Penal Code of 1895, Section 1036. 
Lancaster v. State, 18 S. W. 777, 
is a Tennessee case wherein defendant was con· 
victed of murder, the verdict of the jury being 
''guilty of rnurder in the first degree with mitigat-
ing circumstances.'' Under the Tennessee Btatute 
then in effect (Code Mill. and V., Section 6098) 
where such a verdict was given the court was 
authorized to ''adjudge a punishment short of 
death. ' ' The trial court, however, sentenced the 
defendant· to . die. Ap·peal was taken, one ground 
urged being the abuse of discretion by the triaJ 
judge. The Court in refusing to disturb the sen· 
tence said: 
''After prop·erly overruling motions for a 
new trial and in arrest of judgment, the 
trial judge pronounced sentence of death 
npon the defendant, notwithstanding the 
finding of mitigating circumstances by the 
jury. He~tas authorized to do that, or to 
commute th2 punishment from death to 
imprisonment for life, as in his sound dis-
cretion and upon an unbiased and discrim-
inating survey of the whole case, the hands 
of justice might seem to demand. (Citing 
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(~ode Section and rases.) There 'vas no 
abuse of that discretion in this ease. No 
mitigating circun1stances are disclosed 1n 
the record before us." 
The Tennessee statute referred to, 
Section 6098, Milliken and Vertrees, Code 
of Tennessee, provides: 
~·The Court may also, 'vhere any person is 
convicted of a capital offense, and the jury 
who convicted him state in their verdict 
that they are of the opinion that there are 
mitigating circumstances in the case, com-
mute the punishment from death to im-
prisonment for life in the penitentiary." 
The same Court, in 
Leach v. State (Tenn., 1897), 42 S. \V. 195, 
wherein defendant was found guilty of 1nurde1 
"with mitigating circumstances, n used this Ian· 
g·uage: 
"The jury's finding of 'mitigating cir-
cumstances' devolved upon the trial judge 
tJH• important duty of deciding whether 
the defendant should suffer · the death 
penalty, or undergo imprisonment in the 
State Prison for life. Whether one sen-
tence or the other should be pronounced 
"ras a matter of legal discretion \vith him. 
(Citing Code Section and cases). Being 
of the opinion that the proof disclosed no 
mitigation of the crime, he, rightfully, pro-
nounced the sentence of death ; and this 
Court, concurring in t~at opinion, affirtns 
the judgment.'' 
See also to the same effect 
I~ouis v. State, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 127. 
Forrest v. State, 81 Tenn. ( 13 Lea) 103. 
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In State v. Dooley (Iowa, 1894), 57 N. W. 
414} 
defendant, a 16-year old boy was convicted of the 
crime of murder and sentenced to die. His case 
was appealed and among other matters his counsel 
urged that the penalty was excessive, considerable 
stress being placed upon the character, background 
and past history of defendant. Said the Court: 
''He was not an apt pupil, and his mental 
develop,ment from lack of opportunity or 
of natural ability seems to be a little in-
ferior to the average development" of boys 
of his age. . . . In view of the youth of 
the defendant, his lack of mental develop-
n1ent, and his almost uniformly good con-
duct before the crime was committed, we 
should have been better satisfied had the 
jury designated imprisonment in the pen-
itentiary for life as his punishment; but 
in a l'egal sense, the evidence was suffi-
cient to authorize the punishment des-
ignated and there is no sufficient ground 
upon which we can prevent it.'' 
In Muller v. State (Wis., 1932), 243 N. W. 
411, 
defendant was convicted of embezzlement and mak-
ing false entries with intenf to defraud. On appeal 
he contended that the sentence of three to six years 
which was given him wa.s excessive but the Court 
declined to reduce the penalty, saying: 
'' Comp,laint is made that the sentences im-
posed are excessive. They are clearly 
within the statutes which provide punish-
ment for embezzlement and false entries. 
Section 343.20 and 321.39. While there are 
circumstances which might have justified 
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greater leniency7 \Ye are \vithout pow·er to 
reduce the sentence.'' 
The Wisconsin statutes empower the Appellate 
Court, where it believes that there has been an in 
justice done, to 
''reverse the judgn1ent and direct the trial 
court to Inake the proper judgment in the 
case.'' 
To the same effect are 
(}ald,vin v. Comm. (Ky., 1933), 57 S. W. 
(2d) 487, and 
State v. Johnson, (S. C., 1930), 156 S. E. 
353. 
In State v. Casey (0-re., 192'3), 217 I)ac. 6327 
defendant was convicted of murder in the first de· 
gree. He H.ppealed, admitting the evidence was 
sufficient to establish his guilt bat called attention 
to the fact that another defendant "\Vas acquitted 
on the same evidence upon which defendant was 
s~ntenced to death. He requested that the penalty 
be reduced. The Court said: 
''The defendant, in effect, asks us to com-
mute his sentenc.e from the extreine pen-
alty of the la'v to life imprisonment. We 
are not empo\vered to commute or to par-
don. Such authority is vested by our Con· 
stitution in the executive power, and not 
the judiciary. Casey's crime has been 
measured by the law of the land .. and that 
la"r condemns him." 
The Oregon statute, governing the power of the 
Appellate Court, 
Section 557, Olson's Oregon Laws, 1920, 
reads: 
"Upon the appeal the Appellate Court 
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may affirm, reverse or modify the judg-
ment or decree appealed from.'' 
In State v. Schaffer (IVIont., 1921), 19'7 
Pac. 986, 
defendant was convicted of sedition, the jury leav· 
ing the- penalty to be fixed by the court which 
assessed a fine of $12,000. Defendant appealed, 
contending among other things, that the penalty 
was excessive. 
Section 8805, .Revised Codes of Montana. 
1921~ 
states with regard to Appellate Powers of the 
Supreme Court : 
''The Supreme Court may affirm, reverse 
or modify any judgment or order appealed 
from, and may direet the proper judgment 
or order to be entered, or direct a new trial 
or further proceedings to be had.'' 
In refusing to reduce the penalty imposed in tho 
Schaffer case the Court stated: 
"That the punishment placed upon the de-
fendant a burden greater than he ought to 
have been made to bear is a matter we n1ay 
not consider. The record being free from 
error, this Court has no power to revise the 
sentence nor to modify the judgment, 
though the penalty imposed may seem 
greater than the offender deserved. Re-
lief can only be had through the executive 
bran-ch of the government.'' 
To the same effect is 
State v. Fo,vlee (Mont., 1921), 196 Pac. 992. 
Gurera v. lTnited States, 40 Federal (2d) 
:iBS! 
decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth 
Circuit, expresses the Federal rule with regard to 
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reduction by an Appellate Court of a sentence of 
a lower tribunal, in these words: 
"If there is one rule in the :b'cdernl crim-
inal practice which is firmly established, 
it is that the Appellate Court has no con-
trol over a sentence 'vhich is "\Vitllin the 
lin1its allowed by statute." 
The final case to which we desire to call the Court's 
attention is: 
State v. Junkins (1910, Io\\ra), 126 N. ·w. 
689, 
wherein defendant was convicted of murder in the 
first degree and sentenced to die. In appealing to 
the Io,va Supreme Court, defendant's counsel con-
tended that the punishment was too severe and 
limited their plea to a request for reduction of the 
sentence to life imprisonment, the argument urged 
in support thereof being that defendant was a de .. 
genera.te who, because 
''of a defective organization moulded by 
pre-natal limitations and developed in 
~,Ticion s environments for which he is not 
~--r 0 P''·n~ih1e, is also incapable of apprecia.t-
ing moral or social obligations.'' 
Because the contentions of the defendant's ·counsel 
in that case are so similar to those of counsel for 
apl>ellant in the case no'v before this Court, and be-
cause the views of the Iowa Court coincide so close-
ly with the contentions and belief of the State in 
this case, I quote at length from the de-cision of 
the Court: 
''Nor does the evidence 1nake such a show-
ing of appellant's defective mental and 
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moral capacity as to permit this Court to 
interfere ·with the verdict. He had received 
some degree of education and was able to 
read and vvrite. He app·ears to have known 
how to perform acceptable manual labor 
when disposed to do it. While a slave to 
drink and drugs, his faculties were not so 
obscured on the evening of his awful crilne 
but that he remembered and related the 
circumstances attending it, and the dis-
position made by him of the booty taken 
fro1n the body of his victim. It may be, as 
counsel suggest, that he is the natural and 
inevitable p-roduct of 'Smoky Row' and the 
slums of the city . . . As no\V constituted, 
the la\v ordinarily observes only the overt 
criminal act of the rational individual and 
punishes it without a.ttemp~ting to trace the 
criminal impulse or inclination to its origin. 
People are born and reared under circum-
stances varying from wealth, comfort and 
wholesome examples and influences on the 
one hand, to poverty, misery, and surround-
ings of the most unfa:vorable and corrupt-
ing character on the other, but all are made 
subject to the same law and each must 
render to it the same measure of obedience. 
This is so because such are our human 
limitations that a finer discrimination and 
a juster apportionment of responsibility 
is apparently impossjble, until we lia.ve 
reached a higher plane of civilization than 
has yet been achieved. The appellant has 
been fairly tried under the law as it exists, 
and we find nothing in the general merits 
of thr case a's disclosed by the record which 
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authorizes us to disturb the verdict or 
judgment.'' 
That the Io,va Supren1c Court has the power to re-
duce punishment inflicted bv the district court is 
asserted by that Court in · 
State v. Allen & Allen, 32 IoV\ra 248. 
State v. Freeman, 27 Io,va 333, 
in both of which cases the Court refused to reduce 
the sentences imposed by courts below. See also 
State v. Wilmoth, ~3 Iowa 380. 
State v. Davenport, 149 Iowa 294. 
State v. Nolta, ~18 N. W. 144. 
State v. Bamsey, 22·3 N. W. 873. 
wherein the Iowa Supreme Court refused to reduce 
punishments impoE:ed by lower courts. 
The case here before this Court then resolves itself 
~imply into this situation: 
Ap·pellant, John Markham, a man whose degree or 
mentality may be below normal, deliberately 
planned to rob the deceased!' a n1an 'vhom he had 
kno,vn for some time and \vith \Vhom his relations, 
so far as the record sho,vs, were friendly. De-
fendant had no provocation to commit the crime, 
was under no irresistible pressure to do so, and 
had no motive except to enrich himself. He a.nned 
himself with a lethal weapon - an iron pipe - so 
that he was prepared to kill if necessary to the 
a.ccomplishmen t of the robbery. There is no pre-
tense that he armed himself for protection. His 
purposes \Yere 'vholly aggressive. The robbery was 
perpetrated, though with some difficulty, during 
the course of which defendant did murder his 
victim. 
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Section 103-2.8-3 Revised· Statutes of ·utah, 
1933, 
provides that every murder committed in the per-
petration of or attempt to perpetrate a.ny robbery 
is murder in the first degree. 
Section 103 28-4, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, p-rovides that : 
''Every pers-on guilty of murder in the 
first degree shall suffer death, or, upon the 
recommendation of the jury, may be im-
prisoned at hard labor in the State prison 
for life, in the dis·cretion of the~ court. . . .. , 
So that in the last analysis, it is clearly and un-
mistakably the province of the trial judge to de-
termine what the sentence shall be, regardless of 
the recommendation of the jury. The defendant 
admits this right exists in the trial judge but he 
comes before this Court and sa.ys,· in effect: 
' 'I killed a man while in the p~erpetra tion 
of a robbery; a jury found me t,ruilty of the 
crime of murder and recommended life im-
prisonment. But the judge, in exercising 
a right given him by statute, sentenced me 
to die. If I were a person of normal and 
average intelligence, then it- would be 
proper that I die for my crime. I am not 
insane ; I was not compelled by any 
irresistible force to commit the crime; I 
knew the difference between right and 
. wrong; but I am not quife so bright as the 
average 'individual. Hence, I should not 
suffer a prenalty so severe as death, and 
the action of the trial court, which would 
have been proper if I were of normal 
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n1entality, show·s such an abuse of judicial 
discretion as to amount to error, warrant-
ing interfer\)nce of this Court.'' 
It is our sincere belief that there is nothing in law 
nor in common sense to support such a contention 
of the defendant MarkhaJn. Defendant asks this 
Court to be merciful, where he showed no mercy 
for his victim or his victim's family. However de· 
fective he may be in the attributes which make up 
a normal human being, he is not so lacking in 
capacity to distinguish between right and wrong 
or in power to resist the pleadings of criminal im-
pulses as to justify a miJtigr.ttion of _the punish-
ment which \Yould justly be imposed up·on him- if 
1he were the equal of the average man in resp~ect to 
those qualities. If punishment by death may evet 
be justified, a more fitting case for such punish· 
ment than th·e one before this C-ourt is difficult to 
. . Imagine. 
The case is one wherein the trial judge, after care-
fully considering the facts and evidence produced 
at the trial, concluded that the recommendation of 
the jury was improper and in the exercise of a 
discretion specifically given him by statute, passed 
a sentence contrary to such recommendation. It 
must have been a difficult thing for the court to 
do. Perhaps thiB Court might not have done the 
same thing under similar circumstances, but there 
is nothing in the record to show that the court 
abused its discretionary powers by acting arbitrar-
By, capriciously and without reason, or contrary to 
the· evidence in the .case. It is, therefore, the con-
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tention of the State, which we believe is abundant-
Jy fortified by the record in this case and the rule~ 
laid down in the cases referred to in this brief that 
it is not a rnatter with which this Court can inter-
fere. 
Accordingly, we resp~ectfully submit that no error 
was committed by the court below; that this Court 
cannot properly disturb the judgment of the court 
belo"\\7 ; and that such judgment and sentence should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GROVER A. GILE·S, 
Attorney General of Utah 
ZAR E. HAYES, 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
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